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Abstract
We study the effect of financial crises on hedge fund risk. Using a regime-switching beta model, we 
separate systematic 
and idiosyncratic components of hedge fund exposure. The systematic exposure to various risk factors 
is conditional on market volatility conditions. We find that in the high-volatility regime (when the 
market  is  rolling-down  and  is  likely  to  be  in  a  crisis  state)  most  strategies  are  negatively  and 
significantly exposed to the Large-Small and Credit Spread risk factors. This suggests that liquidity 
risk and credit risk are potentially common factors for different hedge fund strategies in the down-
state of the market, when volatility is high and returns are very low. We further explore the possibility 
that all hedge fund strategies exhibit a high volatility regime of the idiosyncratic risk, which could be 
attributed to contagion among hedge fund strategies. In our sample this event happened only during 
the  Long-Term  Capital  Management  (LTCM)  crisis  of  1998.  Other  crises  including  the  recent 
subprime mortgage crisis affected hedge funds only through systematic risk factors, and did not cause 
contagion among hedge funds.  
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The aim of this paper is to study the e®ect of ¯nancial crises on hedge fund risk. We narrow
down common risk factors across di®erent hedge fund strategies, especially, in the down-state
of the market, which is often associated with ¯nancial crises, and pin down contagion events
that a®ect the whole hedge fund industry not directly driven by systematic state-dependent
exposure to risk factors.
Speci¯cally, we analyze the exposure of hedge fund indexes with a factor model based on
regime-switching volatility, where nonlinearity in the exposure is captured by factor loadings
that are state-dependent (based on market mean and volatility changes). Our approach
is consistent with the time-varying market integration perspective proposed by Bekaert and
Harvey (1995) and the work of Bollen and Whaley (2007) who show that allowing for switch-
ing in risk exposure is essential when analyzing hedge fund performance. Moreover,we build
on the work by Fung and Hsieh (2001,1997) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) and extend their
analysis of dynamic risk exposure in hedge funds by 1) investigating dynamic risk exposure
in hedge funds conditional on the market risk factor states, and 2) accounting for the change
in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor for di®erent hedge fund strategies.
The regime-switching model allows us to measure hedge fund risk exposure in di®erent
market states: up-state, normal, and down-state, which is often associated with market
crises. Moreover, this model allows us to capture the change in volatility of the idiosyncratic
risk factor in di®erent hedge fund strategies and investigate if this change could be associated
with a speci¯c ¯nancial crisis. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper that analyzes the
evolution of volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor for di®erent hedge fund strategies. The
importance of investigating the evolution of idiosyncratic risk in hedge funds is introduced
by Adrian (2007) and Brown and Spitzer (2006).
This investigation is relevant for many reasons. First, capturing the evolution of volatility
of the idiosyncratic risk factor for various hedge fund strategies is essential in (i) evaluating
the possibility of eliminating the idiosyncratic risk through diversi¯cation and (ii) detecting
the presence of diversi¯cation implosion.1 Second, an increase in volatility of the idiosyncratic
risk factor contributes to potential margin calls for hedge fund investors.
Third, and most importantly for our work, the switch in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk
factor allows us to investigate the presence of contagion among hedge funds strategies. In our
framework we de¯ne contagion among hedge funds strategies when we observe a signi¯cant
1This term was coined by Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsaronis (2000), where authors underlie the possibility of
the convergence of opinion among di®erent hedge funds.change in the joint probability that all hedge funds are in the high volatility state for the
idiosyncratic risk factor.
Our de¯nition of contagion is related to the one proposed by Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz
(2007) for hedge funds, who de¯ne contagion as the joint occurrence of large events (i.e., the
probability of one hedge fund having extremely poor performance increases when other hedge
funds also experience extreme poor performance.)2 Speci¯cally, in our framework contagion
is a joint occurrence of the high volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor across hedge fund
indices. Our approach allows us to identify whether the switch to the high volatility regime
coincides with a speci¯c ¯nancial crisis. This means that ¯nancial crises may a®ect the
hedge fund industry not only through the dynamic exposure to market risk factors, but also
through contagion among hedge fund strategies.
Our analysis con¯rms that hedge funds change their exposure based on di®erent market
conditions. We ¯nd that in all cases hedge fund exposure to the S&P 500 in the down-state
of the S&P 500 is smaller than in the normal or up-state of the market. This suggests that
hedge fund managers are able to timely hedge market exposures, especially during ¯nancial
crises. This is consistent with the ¯nding by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) who showed
that hedge funds captured the upturn, but reduced their positions in technology stocks that
were about to decline, avoiding much of the downturn during the technology bubble of 2000.
Moreover, our framework can capture the phase-locking property of hedge funds intro-
duced by Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2005).3 For example, we observe that for all
strategies in the normal market regime, factor loadings are very low or zero for some partic-
ular risk factors, including the S&P 500; however, factor loadings become very large in the
down-market or up-market regimes.
Our results suggest that the common exposures of di®erent hedge fund indices to risk fac-
tors in the down-state of the market are the exposure to the Large-Small risk factor (which
may potentially capture liquidity risk in line with Acharya and Pedersen (2005)), Credit
Spread (i.e., credit risk), and change in VIX. This suggests the possibility of an increase of
the systematic risk exposure among the hedge fund family during market downturns. The
systematic risk is attributed to liquidity and credit risks, two typically nonlinear phenom-
ena, and is more relevant during market downturns that are usually characterized by large
volatility. The recent subprime mortgage crisis of August 2007 emphasized the importance
of credit and liquidity for hedge fund returns. Our ¯ndings are consistent with Khandani
and Lo (2007) who ¯nd an increased correlation between hedge fund styles in this period and
2This de¯nition was originally proposed by Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003).
3The term \Phase-locking" behavior is borrowed from the natural sciences, and refers to a state in which
otherwise uncorrelated actions suddenly become synchronized.
2conjecture that this can be due to the increase in systematic linkages with market factors,
liquidity, and credit proxies.
Finally, our analysis shows that the idiosyncratic risk factor of hedge funds is largely
characterized by changes from a low volatility regime to a high volatility state that are
not directly related to market risk factors. We further explore the occurrence of contagion
among hedge funds in our sample. Speci¯cally, we calculate the joint probability of being
in a high volatility state for all hedge funds. We ¯nd that the joint probability jumps
from approximately 0% in May 1998 to 4% in June 1998 to 13% in July 1998 to 96%
in August 1998, the month of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) collapse. It
started to subside in October 1998. The peak in the joint probability coincides with the
liquidity crisis precipitated by the collapse of the LTCM. The results suggest that the LTCM
crisis not only a®ected market risk factors, but also, after controlling for market and other
factor exposures, a®ected idiosyncratic volatility of hedge funds. This provides evidence that
even after accounting for market and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated
contagion across the hedge fund industry.
We also considered other ¯nancial crises: February 1994 (the U.S. Federal Reserve started
a tightening cycle that caught many hedge funds by surprise), the end of 1994 (Tequila Crisis
in Mexico), 1997 (Asian down-market), the ¯rst quarter of 2000 (a crash of the Internet
boom), March 2001 (Japanese down-market), September 11, 2001, the middle of 2002 (drying
out of merger activities, increase in defaults, and WorldCom accounting problems), and the
recent August 2007 subprime mortgage crisis. However, none of these crises coincided with
all hedge fund strategies being in a high volatility regime of the idiosyncratic risk factor. By
extending the analysis to the recent subprime mortgage crisis, we ¯nd that the crisis a®ected
the hedge fund industry through the exposure to systematic risk factors and in°uenced the
idiosyncratic volatility of several strategies. However, for Emerging Markets and Long Short
Equity strategies, idiosyncratic volatility has not been a®ected. Therefore, we did not ¯nd
any evidence of contagion among all hedge fund strategies. However, we found contagion
among the selected strategies: Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral, Event
Driven Multi-Strategy, and Risk Arbitrage, i.e., we observed a sharp increase in the joint
probability that all of these strategies exhibit a high volatility regime of the idiosyncratic
risk factor during August 2007.
We further test our results that are generated using the regime-switching framework. We
provide a series of robustness checks by comparing our model to 1) a linear factor model; 2)
a linear factor model with a dummy variable for ¯nancial crises; 3) an option-based factor
model (Fung and Hsieh (2004,2002) and Agarwal and Naik (2004)); 4) a linear factor model
that accounts for a switch in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor; and 5) an option-
3based factor model that accounts for a switch in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor.
Our results are robust to these tests and out-of-sample analyses.
The tremendous increase in the number of hedge funds and the availability of hedge fund
data has attracted a lot of attention in the academic literature, which has been concentrated
on analyzing hedge fund styles (Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)),
performance and risk exposure (Bali, Gokcan and Liang (2007), Gupta and Liang (2005),
Agarwal and Naik (2004), Schneeweis, Karavas, and Georgiev (2002), Brealey and Kaplanis
(2001), Edwards and Caglayan (2001), and Fung and Hsieh (1997)), liquidity and systemic
risk (Khandani and Lo (2007), Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2005), and Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004)), the role of hedge funds in ¯nancial crises (Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2004), Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsoronis (2000), Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2000),
and Eichengreen, Mathieson, Chadha, Jansen, Kodres, and Sharma (1998)), and hedge fund
liquidation and failures (Liang and Park (2007) and Getmansky, Lo, and Mei (2004)).
Our work is mostly related to the Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2007) paper that investigates
the presence of contagion among hedge funds and channels through which contagion occurs.4
The authors ¯nd evidence of contagion among hedge funds, but do not identify when these
events happen. In this paper we identify when the contagion events happen and tie them
to the presence of speci¯c ¯nancial crises. In our sample, we ¯nd that contagion among all
hedge fund strategies happened only during the LTCM crisis.
The second related paper is by Adrian (2007) who investigates hedge fund risk and
comovement. He analyzes the evolution of the correlation and variance of hedge fund returns
through time, but does not distinguish between variance generated by the exposure to market
risk factors and the variance generated by the idiosyncratic risk factors. Adrian (2007) and
Khandani and Lo (2007) also show that a hedge fund risk pro¯le during the LTCM crisis was
drastically di®erent from other ¯nancial crises. Our work provides a potential explanation
for this. In fact we show that the LTCM crisis is the only crisis where we observe contagion
among hedge funds strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical
framework for multi-factor regime-switching models that can be used to analyze di®erent
hedge fund style indices. Section 3 describes data and presents results. Section 4 provides
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
4The authors also concentrate on contagion between markets and hedge funds.
42 Theoretical Framework
Linear factor models such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage
pricing theory (APT) have been the foundation of most of the theoretical and empirical
asset pricing literature. Formally, a simple multi-factor model applied to hedge fund index
returns could be represented as:
Rt = ® + ¯It +
K X
k=1
µkFk;t + !ut (1)
where Rt is the return of a hedge-fund index in period t, It is a market factor, for example,
the S&P 500 in period t, Fk;t are k other risk factors, ! is the volatility of the idiosyncratic
risk factor, and ut is IID:
In this model, we can identify the exposure of hedge fund returns to risk factors I and
Fk. Unfortunately this theory constrains the relation between risk factors and returns to be
linear. Therefore it cannot price securities whose payo®s are nonlinear functions of the risk
factors, i.e., hedge fund returns that are characterized by the implementation of dynamic
strategies and whose exposures may change during ¯nancial crises. For this reason we propose
a more °exible and complete model for capturing this feature: a regime-switching model.
A Markov regime-switching model is one in which systematic and un-systematic events
may a®ect the output due to the presence of discontinuous shifts in average return and
volatility.5 The change in a regime should not be regarded as predictable but rather as a
random event. Unlike an exogenous de¯nition of crises (as in the case of crises dummies),
this methodology allows for an endogenous de¯nition of ¯nancial distress.6
5Our speci¯cation is similar to the well-known \mixture of distributions" model. However, unlike standard
mixture models, the regime is not independently distributed over time unless transition probabilities pij are
equal to 1=n, where n is the number of states. The advantage of using a Markov chain as opposed to a
\mixture of distributions" is that the former allows for conditional information to be used in the forecasting
process. This allows us to: (i) ¯t and explain the time series, (ii) capture the well known cluster e®ect,
under which high volatility is usually followed by high volatility (in the presence of persistent regimes), (iii)
generate better forecasts compared to the mixture of distributions model, since regime-switching models
generate a time-conditional forecast distribution rather than an unconditional forecast distribution, and (iv)
provide an accurate representation of the left-hand tail of the return distribution, as the regime-switching
approach can account for \short-lived" and \infrequent" events.
6The Markov switching model is more °exible than simply using a truncated distribution approach, as
at each time t, we have a mixture of one or more normal distributions, and this mixture changes every
time. Using the truncated distribution will lead to a non-parametric estimation, where the down-state of
the market is exogenously imposed, and it is hard to make inferences about beta forecast and conditional
expectations. Instead, we use a parametric model to help us separate the states of the world. We are able
5More formally, the model could be represented as:
Rt = ®(Zt) + ¯(St)It +
K X
k=1
µk(St)Fk;t + !(Zt)ut (2)
It = ¹(St) + ¾(St)²t (3)
where St and Zt are Markov chains with ns and nz states respectively and transition proba-
bility matrices Ps and Pz respectively. The state of the market index I is described by the
Markov chain St. Each state of the market index I has its own mean and variance. The
Markov chain Zt characterizes the change in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk as well as
extra returns captured by ®(Zt). Hedge fund mean returns are related to the states of the
market index I and the states of the idiosyncratic risk volatility. Hedge fund volatilities are
also related to the states of the market index I and are de¯ned by the factor loadings on the
conditional volatility of the factors plus the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor !(Zt).
In both cases ¯ and µk could be di®erent conditional on a state of the risk factor I.
Let us provide an illustration for a three state Markov chain: if ns = 3 (state labels are
denoted as 0, 1 or 2), ¯ depends on the state variable St:
¯(St) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
¯0 if St = 0
¯1 if St = 1
¯2 if St = 2
(4)
and the Markov chain St (the regime-switching process) is described by the following tran-











with p02 = 1 ¡ p00 ¡ p01, p12 = 1 ¡ p10 ¡ p11 and p22 = 1 ¡ p20 ¡ p22. The parameters p00,
p11 and p22 determine the probability of remaining in the same regime. This model allows
to infer time-varying risk exposures of hedge funds, make forecasts, calculate transition probabilities from
one state to another, and calculate conditional expectations.
7Pij is the transition probability of moving from regime i to regime j.
6for a change in variance of returns only in response to occasional, discrete events. Despite
the fact that the states St and Zt are unobservable, they can be statistically estimated (see
for example Hamilton (1990, 1989)). More speci¯cally, once parameters are estimated, the
likelihood of regime changes can be readily obtained, as well as forecasts of ¯t itself. In
particular, because the k-step transition matrix of a Markov chain St is given by Pk
s, the
conditional probability of the regime St+k given date-t data Rt ´ (Rt;Rt¡1;:::;R1) takes
on a particularly simple form when the number of regimes is 2 (regime 0 and 1):
Prob(St+k = 0jRt) = ¼1 + (p00 ¡ (1 ¡ p11))
k
·





(2 ¡ p00 ¡ p11)
(7)
where Prob(St = 0jRt) is the probability that the date-t regime is 0 given the historical
data up to and including date t (this is the ¯ltered probability and is a by-product of the
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure). More generally, the conditional probability of
the regime St+k given date-t data is:






Prob(St = 0jRt) Prob(St = 1jRt) ::Prob(St = njRt)
¸0
(9)
Using similar recursions of the Markov chain, the conditional probability of the Markov
chain Zt+k, that characterizes the change in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk, given date-t
data for strategy i.






Prob(Zi;t = 0jRi;t) Prob(Zi;t = 1jRi;t) ::Prob(Zi;t = nsjRi;t)
¸0
(11)
Our test of contagion is based on the determination of the joint probability that all m




Prob(Zi;t = 1jRi;t) (12)
In our framework we de¯ne contagion among hedge funds strategies when we observe a
signi¯cant change in the joint probability that all hedge funds are in the high volatility state
for the idiosyncratic risk factor, i.e., a large change in Jp.
The importance of using regime-switching models is well established in the ¯nancial
economics literature and examples are found in Bekaert and Harvey's (1995) regime-switching
asset pricing model, Guidolin and Timmermann's (2006) and Ang and Bekaert's (2002)
regime-switching asset allocation models, Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter's (Forthcoming)
regime-switching equity premia model, and Billio and Pelizzon's (2003, 2000) analysis of VaR
calculation, volatility spillover, and contagion among markets. Moreover, regime-switching
models have been successfully applied to constructing trading rules in equity markets (Hwang
and Satchell (2007), equity and bond markets (Brooks and Persand (2001)), and foreign
exchange markets (Dueker and Neely (2004)).
Chan et al. (2005) apply regime-switching models to the CSFB/Tremont hedge fund
indices to analyze the possibility of switching from a normal to a distressed regime in the
hedge fund industry. The implementation of the regime-switching methodology is similar in
spirit to ours; however, we use a regime-switching beta model that can distinguish whether
the distress in the hedge fund industry is generated from the dynamic exposure to systematic
risk factors that are a®ected by ¯nancial crises, from contagion in the hedge fund industry,
or both.
As noted earlier, we use the regime-switching approach for the majority of our analyses.
In addition, we use the linear factor model with a dummy crisis variable, Fung and Hsieh
(2004, 2002) model with option-based factors, an asymmetric beta model, a threshold model,
a linear factor model and the Fung and Hsieh model with the switch in volatility of the
idiosyncratic risk factor, and the Getmansky et al. (2004) approach for accounting for the
smoothing e®ect as robustness tests.
83 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
For the empirical analysis in this paper, we use aggregate hedge-fund index returns from the
CSFB/Tremont database from January 1994 to March 2005. For out-of-sample analysis, we
extend the dataset until July 2007.8 We also extend the data till January 2008 to study the
recent Subprime mortgage crisis.
The CSFB/Tremont indices are asset-weighted indices of funds with a minimum of $10
million of assets under management, a minimum one-year track record, and current audited
¯nancial statements. An aggregate index is computed from this universe, and 10 sub-indices
based on investment style are also computed using a similar method. Indices are computed
and rebalanced on a monthly frequency and the universe of funds is rede¯ned on a quar-
terly basis. We use net-of-fee monthly excess return (in excess of one-month LIBOR). This
database accounts for survivorship bias in hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh (2000)). Table 1
describes the sample size, ¯ with respect to the S&P 500, annualized mean, annualized stan-
dard deviation, minimum, median, maximum, skewness, and excess kurtosis for monthly
CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns as well as for the S&P 500.
[INSERT Table (1) about here]
For our empirical analysis, we evaluate the exposure of hedge fund indices to the market
index, the S&P 500; therefore, we concentrate only on hedge fund styles that either directly
or indirectly have the S&P 500 exposure.9 For example, we concentrate on directional
strategies such as Dedicated Shortseller, Long/Short Equity and Emerging Markets as well
as non-directional strategies such as Distressed, Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Equity Market
Neutral, Convertible Bond, and Risk Arbitrage.
Categories greatly di®er. For example, annualized mean of excess return for the Dedi-
cated Shortseller category is the lowest: -6.48%, and the annualized standard deviation is
the highest at 17.63%. Distressed has the highest mean, 7.32%, but relatively low stan-
dard deviation: 6.69%. The lowest annualized standard deviation is reported for the Equity
Market Neutral strategy at 2.94% with an annualized mean of 4.08%. Hedge fund strate-
gies also show di®erent third and fourth moments. Speci¯cally, non-directional funds such
8Fung and Hsieh option-based factors used in the out-of-sample analysis are downloaded from David
Hsieh's website and are available up to July 2007.
9The model is °exible and can be applied to any market index. For example, for Fixed Income Arbitrage
Funds, ¯tting regimes of Lehman Brothers Bond Index is going to be more appropriate.
9as Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk Arbitrage and Convertible Bond Arbitrage all have
negative skewness and high excess kurtosis. The exception is the Equity Market Neutral
strategy, which has a low positive skewness and excess kurtosis. Directional strategies such
as Dedicated Shortseller, Long/Short Equity have positive skewness and small excess kur-
tosis. Emerging Markets strategy has a slight negative skewness of -0.65 and a small excess
kurtosis. The market factor, the S&P 500, is characterized by high annualized excess re-
turn of 5.52% and high standard deviation of 15.10% during our sample period. Moreover,
the distribution of the market factor is far from normal and is characterized by negative
skewness.
As discussed above, other factors besides the S&P 500 a®ect hedge fund index returns.
We begin with a comprehensive set of risk factors that will be candidates for each of the
risk models, covering stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, emerging markets, momentum
factor, and volatility. These factors are presented in Table 3. They are also described by
Chan et al. (2005) as relevant factors to be used for each hedge fund strategy. Given
the limited dataset, we use a step-wise approach to limit the ¯nal list of factors for our
analysis. Employing a combination of statistical methods and empirical judgement, we use
these factors to estimate risk models for the 8 hedge fund indices. In all our analyses, hedge
fund returns, S&P 500, USD, Lehman Government Credit, Gold, MSCI Emerging Markets
Bond Index, MSCI Emerging Markets Stocks Index and Momentum French factor are used
in excess of one-month LIBOR returns.
[INSERT Table (3) about here]
3.2 S&P 500 regimes
In this section we estimate S&P 500 regimes in order to endogenously identify potential
market downturns that could be associated with ¯nancial distress. Conditional on this
result, in the next Section 3.3 we estimate a multi-factor model.
In order to determine the number of regimes used in the estimation, we estimated and
tested models with di®erent number of regimes and ultimately decided that using three
regimes is optimal for our analysis. Using three regimes is also consistent with the literature
that well recognizes the presence of normal, rolling-up or downturn regions in the returns of
10the equity market.10 Moreover, the use of the three regimes is in line with our objective |
disentangling the e®ect of ¯nancial crises on the hedge fund industry.
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 2.11 S&P 500 returns are in excess of
one-month LIBOR.
[INSERT Table (2) about here]
Table 2 shows that the return pattern of the S&P 500 could be easily captured with three
regimes, where regime 0 has a mean of 5.79% and a relatively low volatility of 1.52%. We
denote this regime as the up-market regime, which has a very low probability of remaining
in the same regime in the following month: P00=28%. Regime 1 has a mean statistically
di®erent than zero and equal to 0.85% and a volatility of 2.49%, and we call it a normal
state. This is a persistent regime, and the probability of remaining in it is 98%. The last
regime, regime 2, which is often associated with ¯nancial crises, captures market downturns
and has a mean of -2.02% and a volatility of 4.51%. The probability of remaining in this
regime is 74%.12
The model estimation allows us to infer when the S&P 500 was in one of the three regimes
for each date of the sample using the Hamilton's ¯lter and smoothing algorithms (Hamilton,
1994).
We observe that in the ¯rst part of the sample, the S&P 500 returns are frequently
characterized by the normal regime 1, in particular from July 1994 to December 1996 (91.7%
of time in normal regime and 8.3% in the market downturn). The period from 1997 through
2003 is characterized primarily by two other regimes: up-market (30.4%) and down-market
(64.6%). This outcome is generated mainly by high instability of the ¯nancial markets
starting from the Asian down-market in 1997, well captured by regime 2, the technology
and internet boom, well captured by regime 0, the Japanese down-market of March 2001,
September 11, 2001, and the market downturns of 2002 and 2003, captured mostly by regime
2. The last part of the sample from 2003 through 2005 is characterized by the normal regime
10Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007) show that an optimal strategy for hedge funds might be
selling out-of-the-money puts and calls, ensuring that during normal regimes, hedge fund managers obtain
a positive cash °ow, and have a large exposure in extreme events.
11All switching regime models have been estimated by maximum likelihood using the Hamilton's ¯lter and
the econometric software GAUSS.
12In all our estimations we compute the robust covariance matrix estimator (often known as the sandwich
estimator) to calculate the standard errors (see Huber (1981) and White (1982)). The estimator's virtue is
that it provides consistent estimates of the covariance matrix for parameter estimates even when a parametric
model fails to hold, or is not even speci¯ed. In all tables we present the t-statistics obtained with the robust
covariance matrix estimators, which allows us to take into account a possibility that data may deviate to
some extent from the speci¯ed model. For the switching-regime models the standard deviations obtained
with the usual covariance matrix estimator and the robust covariance matrix estimator are similar.
111 (100%). It is important to note that the three-regime approach does not imply simply
splitting the data sample into large negative, large positives or close to the mean returns.
The regime approach allows us to capture periods where the return distribution belongs to
large volatility periods characterized by large downturns or more tranquil periods. In all
these di®erent regimes we may face positive or negative returns.13
In addition to analyzing the change in the S&P 500 returns, and probability of being in
a particular regime, we derive both conditional and unconditional distributions for the S&P
500 for all three regimes as well as for the total time series.
[INSERT Figure (1) about here]
Figure 1 depicts unconditional distributions of the S&P 500 overall, in down-market,
normal and up-market regimes. First, during the time period analyzed in the paper, the
market clearly experienced three distinct regimes: up-market, normal and down-market.
Moreover, the total distribution is skewed, and distribution of being in a down-market state
is characterized by fat tails. Figure 1 also depicts conditional distributions of di®erent
regimes, conditional on starting in regime 2, a down-market regime. The resulting total
distribution closely overlaps regime 2 distribution, especially in the left tail. Therefore,
once in down-market, the market is more likely to stay in down-market (74%), and both
conditional regime 2 and total distribution are fat-tailed.
The possibility of characterizing the distribution of the S&P500 during market downturns
allows us to analyze the exposure of the hedge fund industry to the market and other
systematic risk factors when the market is in ¯nancial distress.
[INSERT Figure (2) about here]
Our analysis also allows us to analyze the distribution of the S&P500 and derive hedge
funds risk exposures in the other two regimes.
Figure 2 shows conditional distributions of the S&P 500 overall, in down-market, normal
and up-market regimes ¯rst conditional on an up-market regime and second conditional on
a normal regime. Interestingly, conditional on being in an up-market, there is a certain
probability of staying in an up-market (28%), but there is also a large left-tail probability
of moving to a down-market (67%). It looks like the up-market regime is often transitory,
13This approach is closely compared to an alternative threshold approach where a sample is split into
positive and negative returns, following Fung and Hsieh (1997). These two approaches are carefully compared
in Section 4. More speci¯cally, the regime-switching approach allows us to endogenously determine changes
in market return distributions without exogenously splitting the data into positive and negative returns.
12frequently followed by a down-market regime. Conditional on being in a normal regime,
the total distribution is almost identical to the conditional probability of a normal regime.
Therefore, if a market is in the normal regime, it is more likely to be persistent (98%). The
conditional distributions for all regimes are very close to normal in this case. Nevertheless,
there is a small probability of 2% of moving to an up-market regime that is more likely (67%)
followed by a down-market.
Overall, the results con¯rm that during the period of January 1994 to March 2005, the
S&P 500 was clearly characterized by three separate regimes. In the paper, we are interested
in clearly understanding the exposure of each hedge fund strategy to the market and other
systematic risk factors in all these regimes (i.e., di®erent market conditions).
Using the results in Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that not accounting for three separate
regimes and only concentrating on a normal regime will underestimate the left tail of the
distribution and thus bias hedge fund market risk exposure during market ¯nancial distress.
After having characterized the process for the S&P 500, we analyze the exposure of
di®erent hedge fund strategies to di®erent S&P 500 regimes and other risk factors. The
use of a switching regime beta model allows us to distinguish between dynamic exposure
to systematic risk factors and idiosyncratic risk factors in di®erent volatility regimes. We
separately analyze these two components in the following Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.3 Dynamic Risk Exposure to Systematic Risk Factors
In this section, for each hedge fund strategy we estimate the multi-factor model speci¯ed in
equation (2) and the results are contained in Table 4.14 Here, we are considering nonlinear
exposure to systematic risk factors: S&P 500, Large-Small, Value-Growth, USD, Lehman
Government Credit, Term Spread, change in VIX, Credit Spread, Gold, MSCI Emerging
Markets Bond Index, MSCI Emerging Markets Stock Index, and Momentum factor.15 For
each factor, we estimate three exposures: µi;0 is a hedge fund exposure for a factor i when
the S&P500 is in the up-state; µi;1 is a hedge fund exposure for a factor i when the S&P500
is in the normal state; and µi;2 is a hedge fund exposure for a factor i when the S&P500 is
in the down-state.
[INSERT Table (4) about here]
14All switching regime models have been estimated by maximum likelihood using the Hamilton's ¯lter and
the econometric software GAUSS.
15Because of the limited dataset, the step-wise linear approach was used to limit the ¯nal list of factors
for the analysis.
13Figure 3 presents the synthesis of the results, where the number of strategies with signif-
icant risk exposures to various risk factors conditional on the market states is depicted.
[INSERT Figure (3) about here]
All strategies have exposure to the S&P 500 in at least one regime even after account-
ing for conditional exposure to other risk factors. Moreover, the model shows that factor
exposure is changing conditional on the state of the market.
We ¯nd that in all cases hedge fund exposure to the S&P 500 in the down-state of the
S&P 500 is smaller than in the normal or up-state of the market. This suggests that hedge
fund managers are able to timely hedge market exposures, especially during ¯nancial crises.
We further study if hedge fund managers are able to reduce hedge fund exposure to other
risk factors during ¯nancial market distress.
Our analysis of the dynamic exposures on other risk factors shows that Credit Spread,
Large-Small, and change in VIX are common factors for many hedge fund strategies in
the down-state of the market, as Figure 3 well highlights, suggesting that these factors are
important in accessing systematic hedge fund risk, especially in the down-state of the market,
which is often associated with ¯nancial crises.
In particular, we ¯nd that LS is a common factor in the market downturn for seven out of
eight hedge funds strategies and for six out of eight it has the same sign. This result suggests
that this variable may potentially capture a common factor in the hedge fund industry. A
potential explanation of this result is that liquidity risk is relevant for hedge funds and
liquidity shocks are highly episodic and tend to be preceded by or associated with large
and negative asset return shocks, whereby liquidity risk is rendered a particularly nonlinear
phenomenon. This result is in line with the potential interpretation of Acharya and Schaefer
(2006) that the \illiquidity" prices in capital markets exhibit di®erent regimes. In a normal
regime, intermediaries, including hedge funds, are well capitalized and liquidity e®ects are
minimal. In the \illiquidity" regime usually related to market downturns, intermediaries are
close to their risk or collateral constraints and there is a \cash-in-the-market" pricing (Allen
and Gale (1998, 1994)). In this framework, hedge funds, which often invest in derivatives and
complex structured products, are more likely to be the marginal price setters and therefore
more largely a®ected by the \illiquidity" regime. However, a deep analysis of this issue is
needed and is left to further investigation.
Another common risk factor for hedge funds is Credit Spread, especially the e®ect of the
Credit Spread in the negative states of the market. For most of the strategies (Convertible
Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral, Long/Short Equity, Distressed, and Event-Driven
Multi Strategy), the impact of the Credit Spread in the down-market regime on hedge fund
14index returns is negative. Credit spread can also serve as a proxy for illiquidity risk. When
credit spread increases, cost of capital increases and investors prefer to invest in more liquid
and high-quality instruments. Therefore, low-credit illiquid investments su®er.
Also change in VIX is a common risk factor for the hedge fund industry. Change in VIX
is a variable that needs to be interpreted jointly with di®erent regimes of the S&P 500. For
the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy, the e®ect of Change in VIX is negative in crises
markets (-0.08) and positive in up-markets (0.05). The relationship between a convertible
bond price and stock price is concave when stock price is low (down-market) and highly
convex when the stock price is high (up-market). Therefore, in the up-market, we expect
change in volatility to attribute to additional returns of the strategy, and in down-markets,
the change in volatility negatively a®ects the returns of the strategy.
For Risk Arbitrage, the exposure to change in VIX is positive and signi¯cant, espe-
cially during normal periods (0.09), but negative during down-market periods (-0.12). Risk
Arbitrage strategy is concerned with the success of a merger, and increase in volatility in
down-times often signals an increase in probability of failure. The same applies to Distressed
strategies (-0.22 in down-state and 0.24 in the normal state).
Another example is the e®ect of change in VIX for the Dedicated Shortseller strategy.
We ¯nd that the exposure to the change in VIX is highly positive only in the negative market
state (0.27), but negative in all other states (-0.42 for up-state and -0.27 for normal state).
In this case the exposure to the change in VIX is opposite to all other strategies, possibly
due to the nature of the strategy that pro¯ts from negative volatility shocks to the market.
In many cases, exposures to the change in VIX have opposite signs and similar magnitudes
for down and normal markets; and this is the main reason why linear factors are usually not
able to capture this exposure.16
3.4 Idiosyncratic Risk Factor
In addition to the analysis of expected market exposures, the regime-switching beta model
allows us to obtain the evolution of the idiosyncratic risk for separate hedge fund strategies.
To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper that captures the evolution of the volatility of the
idiosyncratic risk factors for di®erent hedge fund strategies.
In particular, our estimation of the Markov chain for the idiosyncratic risk of hedge funds
16As a robustness check, we test whether statistically signi¯cant coe±cients are also statistically di®erent
from each other. We investigate this aspect for di®erent hedge fund indices, and indeed for some coe±cients
we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal. Nevertheless, even if some of the estimated coe±cients
are similar, we are able to ¯nd that some of them are statistically equal only in two of the three states. This
con¯rms that factor exposures change conditional on di®erent states.
15shows that the idiosyncratic risk is characterized by two di®erent regimes with high and low
volatility for 6 of the 8 strategies. Exceptions are Distressed and Dedicated Shortseller,
which are always characterized by a large volatility regime (idiosyncratic volatility is 1.36%
for Distressed and 2.31% for Dedicated Shortseller, Table 4). These monthly volatilities are
in-line with high volatility regimes for other strategies. The volatility parameters in the two
volatility regimes (high and low) are largely di®erent, and the idiosyncratic risk factor of all
6 strategies shows that the volatility in the high regime is at least twice the volatility in the
low volatility regime of the idiosyncratic risk (see in Table 4 for values of $0 and $1:).
The estimated probability of switching from one regime to another is on average about
10%, but the probability of remaining in the same regime is about 90%, meaning that
volatility regimes are quite persistent.
Using the model speci¯cation described in equation 2 and presented in Table 4, in Figures
4 and 5 we show the evolution of the probability of being in the high volatility regime for all
6 strategies.
[INSERT Figure(4) about here]
[INSERT Figure(5) about here]
Figures 4 and 5 plot monthly probabilities from January 1994 to March 2005 of hedge
fund indices facing a high volatility regime for the idiosyncratic risk factor, i.e., volatility
of the hedge fund indices not related to the volatility of the S&P 500 index and other risk
factors. We see that the evolution of the volatility of di®erent strategies is quite di®erent.
In particular, we observe that Long/Short Equity and Emerging Markets indices present a
low probability of being in the high volatility regime in the last part of the sample and a
high probability in the middle of the sample that corresponds to the series of crises and
rallies from 1997 till 2001. Therefore, the risk faced by the S&P 500 already captured by the
switching beta is ampli¯ed in the middle of the sample for these strategies. This indicates
not only that the exposure to the S&P 500 is changing, but also that the idiosyncratic risk
of the hedge fund indices may switch to the high-volatility regime at the same time when
the market is characterized by turbulence. This can be explained by contagion among hedge
fund strategies.
Event Driven Multi-Strategy is almost always characterized by the low volatility regime
for its idiosyncratic risk factor; however, the probability of a high volatility regime greatly
increases for periods characterized by high illiquidity events and other unexpected shocks not
16correlated with market returns. For example, in February 1994, the U.S. Federal Reserve
started a tightening cycle that caught many hedge funds by surprise, causing signi¯cant
dislocation in bond markets worldwide; the end of 1994 witnessed the start of the \Tequila
Crisis" in Mexico; in August 1998, Russia defaulted on its government debt and LTCM
collapsed leading to a liquidity crunch in worldwide ¯nancial markets; the ¯rst quarter of
2000 saw a crash of the Internet boom, and in the middle of 2002 there was a drying out of
merger activities, a decrease in defaults and the release of news about WorldCom accounting
problems. During all of these periods, the probability of a high volatility regime skyrocketed,
reaching 1 for the LTCM and the Russian default crisis.
The most interesting result is the evolution of being in the high volatility regime by the
Convertible Bond Arbitrage index that indicates that the strategy has moved to a large
volatility regime from the end of 2003 and is still characterized by this regime at the end
of the sample considered (March 2005). If we jointly consider the state of the market index
(tranquil normal period in the last two years of the sample) and the state of the idiosyncratic
risk factor for the Convertible Bond Arbitrage index, we see that the switching regime beta
model is able to disentangle whether the source of risk is characterized by market conditions
or by potential distress in the hedge fund index strategy. Not surprisingly, April 2005 (not in
the sample period) saw extremely low returns and high liquidations in the Convertible Bond
Arbitrage sector. Merely tracking market exposure will not lead to this predictive result.
We further explore the probability that all hedge fund strategies exhibit idiosyncratic
risk in a high volatility regime. This could be interpreted as a proxy measure for contagion
between di®erent hedge fund strategies. Speci¯cally, we calculate the joint ¯ltered probability
of being in a high volatility state for all hedge funds and plot them in Figure 6. We ¯nd that
the joint ¯ltered probability jumps from approximately 0% in May 1998 to 4% in June 1998
to 13% in July 1998 to 96% in August 1998, the month of the LTCM collapse. It started
to subside in October 1998. The peak in the joint probability coincides with the liquidity
crisis precipitated by the collapse of LTCM.17 The results suggest that the LTCM crisis not
only a®ected market risk factors, but also, after controlling for market and other systematic
factor exposures, a®ected idiosyncratic volatility of hedge funds. This provides evidence that
even after accounting for market and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated
contagion across the hedge fund industry.
[INSERT Figure(6) about here]
17We check this result against a possibility that randomly we can have all eight strategies exhibiting high
volatility regimes at the same time.
173.5 Subprime Mortgage Crisis
In the sample considered, we found that the LTCM crisis was the only case where the
joint probability of being in a high volatility state for all hedge fund strategies spiked and
approached one. Given the recent subprime mortgage crisis of August 2007 and speculations
that hedge funds might be a®ected by this crisis, we performed a similar analysis for this
period.
Khandani and Lo (2007) ¯nd an increased correlation between hedge fund styles in this
period. The authors suggest that this can be due to the increase in systematic linkages
with market factors, liquidity, and credit proxies. In our framework, we test whether the
increase in correlations is due to the increase in the systematic linkages or due to contagion.
Speci¯cally, we re-estimate our model till January 2008 and ¯nd that the coe±cients to
Large-Small (liquidity proxy) and Credit Spread (credit proxy) increased when the subprime
mortgage crisis period is taken into account, con¯rming Khandani and Lo (2007)'s conjecture.
Furthermore, we explored whether contagion among hedge funds occurred during the
subprime mortgage crisis. Speci¯cally, we obtained individual estimates for probability of
high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for the same six hedge fund strategies:
Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Long Short Equity, Risk Arbitrage, Convertible Bond Arbi-
trage, Emerging Markets, and Equity Market Neutral strategies.18
The obtained evolutions of the idiosyncratic risk factor are plotted in Panels A and
B of Figure 7 from January 2005 through January 2008. The probability of being in a
high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk
Arbitrage, Convertible Bond Arbitrage, and Equity Market Neutral greatly increased during
the subprime mortgage crisis of August 2007. Therefore, these strategies were a®ected
by the crisis, even after taking into account systematic risk exposure. Long Short Equity
experienced only a slight increase at the end of 2007. However, Emerging Markets category
had a zero probability of being in a high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor
during the whole time period. As a result, the joint probability of a high volatility state for
all strategies is zero during the subprime mortgage crisis (Figure 8, Panel A).19 Even though
the subprime mortgage crisis a®ected separate hedge fund categories (Panels A and B of
Figure 7), it did not a®ect the hedge fund industry as a whole and did not lead to contagion
among all hedge fund categories.
18Dedicated Shortseller and Distressed still present only one volatility regime, therefore, are omitted from
the analysis.
19The result is robust even when Emerging Markets are taken out from the estimation.
18[INSERT Figure(7) about here]
We further concentrate our analysis on the four strategies that were a®ected by the crisis:
Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk Arbitrage, Convertible Bond Arbitrage, and Equity Mar-
ket Neutral and calculate the joint probability of the high volatility state of the idiosyncratic
risk factor. As expected, we ¯nd some evidence of contagion among these four strategies, i.e.,
evidence of a signi¯cant increase in the co-movement of the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk
factor for these strategies, as shown in Figure 8, Panel B. In this case, the joint probability
of high volatility in August 2007 (subprime mortgage crisis) is below 50%. If we compare
this result with the one obtained during the LTCM crisis that reaches a joint probability
higher than 95%, we can conclude that the LTCM was the only crisis where the whole hedge
fund industry was a®ected.
[INSERT Figure(8) about here]
4 Robustness Analysis
After documenting the existence of common factor exposures among hedge fund strategies
during market downturns and ¯nding that the LTCM was the only crisis in our sample that
precipitated contagion among hedge funds, we investigate the robustness of our results.
First, we would like to compare our model to other models available in the literature in
the ability of capturing hedge fund risk exposures. Speci¯cally, in this section we compare
our multi-factor regime-switching model for analysis of hedge fund style indices to a linear
factor model, an asymmetric beta model, a threshold model, a linear factor model with a
dummy variable for the presence of ¯nancial crises, and Fung and Hsieh (2004, 2002) option-
based model. We also adjust for potential illiquidity and smoothing in the data, check that
the regime-switching approach is applicable to individual hedge funds as well as indices, and
perform an out-of-sample analysis.
Second, it is possible that our ¯nding of contagion among hedge funds during the LTCM
crisis is driven by the way we model systematic risk factor exposures. This ¯nding can be
attributed to (i) nonlinearities generated using our regime-switching model, or (ii) nonlin-
earities in hedge fund returns that could be easily captured using option-like factors, but are
not captured with the regime-switching model. In order to address these concerns we extend
the linear factor model and the Fung and Hsieh (2004,2002) option-based factor model to
19include the change in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor. The analysis of the joint
probability of the high volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor for these models provides a
robustness test for our result.
4.1 Comparison with a Linear Factor Model
In this section we compare our multi-factor regime-switching model with a linear factor
model (LFM). Unlike LFM, our model is able to capture hedge fund factor exposures during
di®erent market conditions, especially, during market crises.
The results for the LFM are presented in Table 5. The comparison with the LFM
regression shows that LFM is missing some factor exposures and does not take into account
time-variability of risk factors based on market conditions.
[INSERT Table (5) about here]
In fact, our analysis shows that many factor exposures are characterized by the phase-
locking property. For example, the exposure to the S&P 500 is negligible during normal
states of the market for the Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral, and Event
Driven Multi-Strategy, but changes to positive in up- or down-states of the market. Also, the
exposure to Lehman Government Credit is negligible for Convertible Bond Arbitrage and
Long/Short Equity indices; however, it becomes highly positive and signi¯cant for up- and
down-market states. The exposure to UMD is negligible in the normal state of the market
for Long/Short Equity and Event Driven Multi-Strategy, but becomes highly positive and
signi¯cant in the up- or down-states.
Nevertheless, the phase-locking phenomenon could be produced by dynamic strategies
and/or a factor exposure of hedge fund asset portfolio that becomes statistically relevant
only during ¯nancial distress. With our approach we are not able to distinguish among
the two phenomena and simply capture the total exposure that arises from both dynamic
strategies and asset portfolio nonlinear exposures.
On average, the e®ect of a factor can be negligible; however, this is due to lumping the
e®ect of the factor instead of separately calculating exposures in up-market, down-market,
and normal states. We ¯nd that often exposures during up- and down-markets are of opposite
signs, and often, the exposures during normal states are not signi¯cant from zero. Therefore,
if we do not separate the factor e®ects into di®erent market regimes, we underestimate the
real hedge fund exposure to this factor.
20We ¯nd that change in VIX is important for hedge fund strategies, and, speci¯cally, the
exposure of hedge fund strategies to the change in VIX is nonlinear and depends on the state
of the market. Moreover, we ¯nd that exposures to several factors, such as LS and Credit
Spread, are highly negative for most strategies in the down-market state.
In terms of goodness-of-¯t for nonlinear models we use the pseudo R2 approach proposed
by McFadden (1974). This measure has also been used by Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2007)
to compare di®erent hedge fund risk models. The results show that the regime-switching
model is clearly superior to the LFM model based on the pseudo R2 metric.
4.2 Comparison with Nonlinear Factor Models
An alternative way to investigate how our results are di®erent from other models that account
for nonlinear exposures to market risk factors is to analyze risk exposures highlighted with
(i) an asymmetric beta model, (ii) a threshold model, and (iii) an option-based factor model.
Asymmetric Beta and Threshold Models
In the asymmetric beta model the distribution of Rt is truncated either at the median or
zero and betas for \up or down" markets are compared. This approach has been applied to
hedge funds in Chan et al. (2005), Agarwal and Naik (2004), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001),
and Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001). We further extend the asymmetric beta model and
develop a threshold model allowing for three states. Speci¯cally, we look at asymmetric
betas in hedge fund exposure by specifying di®erent beta coe±cients for down-markets,
normal markets, and up-markets. Speci¯cally, we consider the following regression:
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0 otherwise
(14)
where It is the return on the index, ¹ is the mean and ¾ is its standard deviation.





t , the standard linear model in which fund i's market betas are






i . The speci¯cation (13) essentially tries to capture asymmetries in
the index exposures.
Using the speci¯cation (13), we regress hedge fund returns on the S&P 500 index during
up (I
+
t ), normal (I0
t ), and down (I
¡
t ) conditions.20 Beta asymmetries are quite pronounced
especially, for Emerging Markets, Distressed, Event Driven Multi-Strategy, and Equity Mar-
ket Neutral. For example, the Equity Market Neutral index has zero normal and down-
market betas | seemingly market neutral | however, its up-market beta is 0.14. The
exposure of the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy to the S&P 500 is negligible for both
normal and down-markets, and is slightly positive (0.07) for the up-market.
The results using the threshold model are similar to the ones obtained using the regime-
switching methodology. However, there are several numerical di®erences. For example, the
regime-switching methodology ¯nds that the Market-Neutral strategy has market-neutral
exposure in all states except an up-market state. However, the threshold methodology ¯nds
positive market exposure in up (I
+
t ) and down (I
¡
t ) states. Regime-switching methodology
also identi¯es a positive market exposure in the \up-market" state for the Event Driven
Multi-Strategy, whereas the threshold methodology misses this link.
Comparing the two models, we observe that regime-switching model ¯ts data much better
than the threshold or asymmetric beta models. For example, for all styles, pseudo R2 for
regime-switching models exceeds pseudo R2 for threshold models, and in particular improves
model ¯t for Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral, and Event Driven Multi-
Strategy. Therefore, the regime-switching models are able to capture linkages between hedge
fund returns and the S&P 500 that are not possible to analyze by simply splitting past returns
in di®erent return quintiles. Moreover, asymmetric and threshold models have exogenous
de¯nitions of a state. The regime-switching methodology allows for a °exible endogenous
de¯nition of a state and is able to categorize state distributions in terms of means and
variances. This cannot been done with either asymmetric or threshold models. Based on
this evidence, we conclude that regime-switching methodology is superior to threshold and
asymmetric models for our analysis.
Option-Based Factor Model
An option-based factor model was originally proposed by Fung and Hsieh (2004, 2002) to
explain hedge fund returns. We compare our multi-factor regime-switching model (MRSM)
to the Fung and Hsieh's model (FHM), and results are presented in Table 6. The option-
based factor model also shows evidence of the presence of a common exposure to the LS
(liquidity) factor and a slightly common exposure to the credit spread (CS).
20Results are not presented here but are available upon request.
22Moreover, we observe that the MRSM ¯ts the data better than the FHM. In fact for all
styles, pseudo R2 for the MRSM is larger than the one for the FHM. Therefore, the MRSM
model comparably well captures systematic risk exposure of hedge funds.
[INSERT Table (6) about here]
Given that the focus of the option-based model is to explain hedge fund returns rather
than investigate hedge fund risk exposure during ¯nancial crises, this model is unable to
highlight if hedge fund strategies present a common risk exposure during market downturns.
Linear Factor Model with a Crisis Dummy
The objective of our paper is to investigate the impact of ¯nancial crises on hedge fund risk
exposures. With the regime-switching model we have endogenously identi¯ed a down-market
(crisis) state. Our analysis shows that hedge fund exposures during market downturns are
di®erent from normal and up-market conditions. We investigate whether this change in the
exposures can also be captured with a simple dummy variable for the presence of ¯nancial
crises. We have created a dummy variable that is equal to one when we observe the Mexican,
Asian, Russian and LTCM, Brazilian, Argentinean, and Internet crises (the crises periods
are identi¯ed by Rigobon (2003), Table 2).21
As Table 7 shows, the crisis dummy variable is often signi¯cant for di®erent risk factors.
This con¯rms that during crisis periods risk exposures of hedge funds change and not always
lead to the reduction of those risk exposures. The increases of risk exposures during crises
are mixed and partially ¯t with those we found with the MRSM. However, the linear factor
model with a crisis dummy is rather simple and may not capture all nonlinear exposures
hedge funds may present.
Adjusted R2 for the model that accounts for the crisis dummy is higher than for the
model that does not account for the crisis dummy, con¯rming that risk exposures of hedge
funds change during crisis periods. Moreover, Pseudo R2 is higher for this model compared
to the option-based FHM model. However, Pseudo R2 is lower than that for the multi-factor
regime-switching MRSM model, indicating that it is important to control for crisis periods
when evaluating risk exposure for hedge funds.
[INSERT Table (7) about here]
21The list of factors is consistent with the main analysis, where due to the limited dataset the step-wise
linear approach was used to limit the ¯nal list of factors.
234.3 Data Smoothing and Illiquidity E®ect
As shown by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), observed hedge fund returns are biased
by performance smoothing and illiquidity, leading to autocorrelation of hedge fund returns
on a monthly basis. Following the approach of Getmansky et al. (2004), we de-smooth
returns using the following procedure:
Denote by Rt the true economic return of a hedge fund in period t, and let Rt satisfy the
following single linear factor model:
Rt = ¹ + ¯¤t + ²t ; E[¤t] = E[²t] = 0 ; ²t ; ¤t » IID (15a)
Var[Rt] ´ ¾
2 : (15b)
True returns represent the °ow of information that would determine the equilibrium value
of the fund's securities in a frictionless market. However, true economic returns are not
observed. Instead, Ro
t denotes the reported or observed return in period t, and let
R
o
t = µ0 Rt + µ1 Rt¡1 + ¢¢¢ + µk Rt¡k (16)
µj 2 [0;1] ; j = 0;:::;k (17)
1 = µ0 + µ1 + ¢¢¢ + µk (18)
which is a weighted average of the fund's true returns over the most recent k+1 periods,
including the current period. Similar to the Getmansky et al. (2004) model, we estimate
MA(2) model where k=2 using maximum likelihood method.
In line with this approach we determine Ro
t, i.e., \real returns" and estimate our models
on the real returns.22 The results show that indeed there is evidence of data smoothing, but
the estimated exposure to the di®erent factors conditional on the states of the market are
largely una®ected by the smoothing phenomenon.23
Moreover, the dynamics of the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor are not a®ected
by data smoothing or illiquidity; and the result about the joint probability that switches
from zero to more than 95% during LTCM crisis is con¯rmed.
22Results are not presented here but are available upon request.
23We also estimate the following model for real returns and compare the estimates using the observed
returns: Rt = ®(Zt) + ¯(St)It +
PK
k=1 µkFkt + !(Zt)ut;It = ¹(St) + ¾(St)²t: We also show that there is
indeed evidence of data smoothing; however, the estimated exposure to di®erent factors is largely not a®ected
by smoothing. Results are available on request.
244.4 Single Hedge Funds Exposure
We investigate whether the exposures we observe on hedge fund indices are in line with those
we may ¯nd for single hedge funds in order to determine the degree of heterogeneity of hedge
funds within each index and its e®ect on factor exposures. We randomly select di®erent hedge
funds for all categories and repeat all analyses described in the paper. Results show that
exposures of single hedge funds to various factors are in line with index exposures.24
4.5 Normality of Residuals Test
One of the reasons for introducing a regime-switching approach is to address non-normality
in observed hedge fund index returns. If a regime-switching approach accurately describes
the return process of hedge fund indices, then we expect residuals in the regime-switching
models to be normally distributed. Therefore, we implement Jarque-Bera test, which is
a goodness-of-¯t measure of departure from normality, based on the sample kurtosis and
skewness.25
In the original data, normality test was rejected for all strategies except the Market
Neutral strategy.26
When a multi-factor model (MRSM) is considered, normality is accepted for 6 out of 8
strategies. Therefore, based on the improvement in normality in our results, we conclude
that regime-switching models are able to capture nonlinear properties of original hedge fund
index series. Nevertheless, there is still space for improvement, since for two hedge funds
strategies normality test is still rejected.
4.6 Out-of-Sample Analysis of Hedge Fund Risk Exposure
In this section we conduct an out-of-sample analysis of hedge fund risk exposures. Hedge fund
risk exposures are estimated in-sample, and the validity of these risk exposures is analyzed
in out-of-sample data.
If risk exposures do not underlie the true return generating processes of hedge funds, then
24Detailed results for all models and for all individual hedge funds in each category are available upon
request.




4 ), where S is the skewness, K
is the kurtosis, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of estimated coe±cients used to create
the series. The statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom and can be
used to test the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution.
26Market Neutral strategy is the oldest hedge fund strategy. This investment strategy aims to produce
almost the same pro¯t regardless of market circumstances, often by taking a combination of long and short
positions. It is not designed to use options or other nonlinear instruments.
25the out-of-sample analysis of hedge fund returns and risk using in-sample risk exposures will
not conform with reality. However, if risk exposures estimated in-sample represent the true
economic risks of various hedge fund strategies, then these risk exposures can indeed track
the out-of-sample returns and risk of hedge fund strategies.
In order to access the validity of our risk model, we follow the approach introduced by
Agarwal and Naik (2004). Speci¯cally, we construct a replicating portfolio for each hedge
fund index strategy using the factor loadings obtained from our multi-factor regime-switching
beta model (MRSM). We compute the di®erence between the monthly return on the hedge
fund index and that of the replicating portfolio. Speci¯cally, at each time t, factor loadings
are estimated, and are combined with the value of risk factors at t + 1 to construct returns
of the replicating portfolio.27
We use an out-of-sample of 33 observations (from November 2004 to July 2007) and
therefore this procedure is repeated 33 times.28 We further conduct standard tests on the
signi¯cance of the mean di®erence between the actual hedge fund index returns and returns
of replicating portfolios. Speci¯cally, we calculate a model performance measure: Mean
Absolute Error (MAE). We use this measure to compare the following models: Linear factor
model (LFM), Random Walk (RW), Fung and Hsieh option-based model (FHM), and multi-
factor regime-switching beta (MRSM). We report the results in Table 8.
[INSERT Table (8) about here]
We ¯nd that for six out of the eight strategies considered the MSRM model always
has a smaller MAE compared to LFM, RW, and FHM models. For other two strategies,
the MAE is close to the minimum. Therefore, we conclude that a portfolio based on risk
exposures estimated through the multi-factor regime-switching model is at least as good as
that based on LFM and FHM models in replicating hedge fund returns during the out-of-
sample period. This suggests that regime-switching models are able to capture at least some
dominant systematic risk exposures of hedge funds.
4.7 Analysis of Idiosyncratic Risk Using LFM and FHM Models
As discussed above, for most of the sample we ¯nd the joint probability of high idiosyncratic
volatility for all hedge funds, our proxy for contagion, is approximately zero, but there are
27The information set for the risk factors uses t+1 information in order not to introduce estimation errors
in the value of risk factors. Thus, we estimate conditionally on risk factor data.
28We stop in July 2007 because option-based factors from David Hsieh's website are available through
July 2007.
26three months among the 157 considered where we ¯nd that the joint probability that all
hedge funds are in the high idiosyncratic volatility regime is close to 1 | during the LTCM
crash of August 1998. It is possible that our ¯nding of contagion among hedge funds during
the LTCM crisis is driven by the way we model systematic risk factor exposures. For this
reason we extend the linear factor (LFM) and Fung and Hsieh option-based (FHM) models
by directly modeling a change in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor.
Formally, for the Linear Factor Idiosyncratic Switching Volatility model (LFIM) we esti-
mate the following:
Rt = ®(Zt) + ¸kLk;t + !(Zt) (19)
where Rt is the return of a hedge-fund index in period t, Lk;t are k linear factors, and ! is
the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor. The Markov chain Zt characterizes the change
in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor.
Moreover, for the Fung and Hsieh Idiosyncratic Switching Volatility model (FHIM) we
estimate the following:
Rt = ®(Zt) + ¸kHk;t + !(Zt) (20)
where Rt is the return of a hedge-fund index in period t, Hk;t are k Fung and Hsieh option-
based factors, and ! is the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor.
The joint high volatility probabilities of idiosyncratic risk factor for both models are
reported in Figure 9.
[INSERT Figure(9) about here]
Figure 9 is qualitatively similar to the result obtained before. For both models, the joint
probability that all the hedge fund strategies switch to a high volatility regime is almost zero
during the sample considered. The only exception is during the LTCM crisis. The probability
for the LFIM changes from zero to 60%. It is possible that some element of noise is present
and the model is not able to disentangle this e®ect from the evolution of the idiosyncratic
volatility. However, when FHIM is considered, the joint probability is almost identical to
27the one estimated with the multi-factor regime-switching model. This con¯rms that the
LTCM crisis is the only case which precipitated contagion among hedge funds strategies,
even though the market was characterized by other crises in the sample considered.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the e®ect of ¯nancial crises on hedge fund risk. We analyze state-
dependent risk exposures for various hedge fund strategies, identify common risk factors
across di®erent hedge fund strategies, especially, in the down-state of the market, and isolate
a crisis event where all di®erent hedge fund strategies move to a high volatility state due to
non-market related shocks.
We characterize the exposure of hedge fund indices to risk factors using switching regime
beta models. This approach allows us to analyze time-varying risk exposure and the phase-
locking phenomenon for hedge funds. In particular, the changes in hedge fund exposure to
various risk factors explicitly account for the change in volatility of the market risk factor.
We have three main results. First, we show that exposures can be strongly di®erent
in the down-market and up-market regimes compared to normal times, suggesting that
risk exposures of hedge funds in the down-market regimes, which are often associated with
¯nancial crises, are quite di®erent than those faced during normal regimes. We ¯nd that in
most cases hedge fund exposure to the S&P 500 in the down-state of the S&P 500 is smaller
than in the normal or up-state of the market. This suggests that hedge fund managers are
able to timely hedge market exposures, especially during ¯nancial crises.
Second, we ¯nd that Credit Spread, Large-Small, and change in VIX are common hedge
fund factors in the down-state of the market, suggesting that these factors are important in
accessing hedge fund risk especially in the down-state of the market, when ¯nancial crises are
more prevalent. Speci¯cally, in the market downturn regime six out of eight strategies are
all negatively and signi¯cantly exposed to the Large-Small risk factor (this represents 84% of
hedge funds in the sample). This feature is important in light of the results of Acharya and
Petersen (2005) that the size risk factor is capturing liquidity risk. In summary, our results
suggest that liquidity and credit are important risk factors for hedge fund returns especially
when the markets are in a crisis state.
Third, we have allowed for a possibility and found evidence that all hedge fund strategies
exhibit a high volatility regime of the idiosyncratic risk during the sample considered. We
¯nd that for almost all of the sample the joint probability of high idiosyncratic volatility for
28all hedge funds is approximately zero, but there are three months among the 157 considered
where we ¯nd that the joint probability that all hedge funds are in the high idiosyncratic
volatility regime is close to 1 | at the LTCM crash. This provides evidence that even after
accounting for market and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated contagion
across the hedge fund industry. This is the only crisis event that generated this result, even
though the market was characterized by other crises in the sample considered. In fact, our
analysis shows that other crises including the recent subprime mortgage crisis a®ected hedge
funds only through systematic risk factors, and did not cause contagion among hedge funds.
Understanding hedge fund risk exposure and contagion is important for investors, risk
managers, and regulators. Contagion among hedge funds eliminates the bene¯ts of portfolio
diversication and may lead to diversi¯cation implosion.29 Moreover, it can lead to potential
margin calls for hedge fund investors. Furthermore, both contagion and potential increase
in systematic exposure during ¯nancial crises can lead to systemic risk. Identifying common
risk factors, especially in the down-state of the market and sources of contagion among hedge
funds can help address regulators' concern regarding the potential risk hedge funds may pose
for stability of ¯nancial markets.
29For examples of diversi¯cation implosion in hedge funds, see Fung, Hsieh and Tsatsoronis (2000).
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33Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for monthly CSFT/Tremont hedge-fund index returns as well as for
the S&P 500 returns from January 1994 to March 2005. All returns are in excess of one-month LIBOR. N
is the number of observations, ¯S&P500 is contemporaneous market beta, Ann. Mean is annualized mean
return, Ann. SD is annualized standard deviation. Min, Med and Max are annualized minimum, median and
maximum returns. Skew measures skewness and Kurt measures excess kurtosis. JB Stat. is the Jarque-Bera
statistics with a corresponding p-value.




Min  Med  Max  Skew  Kurt  JB Stat. p-value 
Conv. Bond Arb  135 0.04  3.24  4.71  -5.29  0.59  3.04  -1.43  6.63  119.96  0.00 
Dedicated Shortseller  135 -0.89  -6.48  17.63  -9.29  -0.95  22.06  0.83  4.84  34.58  0.00 
Emerging Markets  135 0.54 3.12  16.97  -23.68  0.83  15.92  -0.65  7.13  105.21  0.00 
Equity Mkt Neutral  135 0.07  4.08  2.94  -1.68  0.33  2.68  0.14  3.32  1.02  0.60 
Long/Short Equity  135 0.41  6.12  10.50  -12.08  0.43  12.5  0.19  6.7  77.64  0.00 
Distressed 135 0.24  7.32  6.69  -13.1  0.79  3.58  -2.88  20.67  1942.12  0.00 
Event Driven MS  135 0.19  4.68  6.17  -12.17  0.45  4.15  -2.72  20.51  1891.51  0.00 
Risk Arb  135 0.12  2.16  4.26  -6.8  0.19  3.19  -1.4  9.95  315.67  0.00 
S&P 500  135  1.00  5.52  15.10  -15.09  0.97  9.25  -0.59  3.47  9.05  0.01 
34Figure 1: Unconditional and Conditional Distributions of the S&P 500 in 3
Regimes
The ¯rst panel describes unconditional distribution of the S&P 500 as a mixture of the down-market, up-
market and normal regimes. S&P 500 returns are in excess of one-month LIBOR. The second panel describes
the distribution of the S&P 500 conditional on the down-market regime. There are 3 states of the market:


































































35Figure 2: Conditional Distributions of the S&P 500 in 3 Regimes
The ¯rst panel describes the distribution of the S&P 500 conditional on the up-market regime. S&P 500
returns are in excess of one-month LIBOR. The second panel describes the distribution of the S&P 500
conditional on the normal regime. There are 3 states of the market: regime 0 is an up-market regime, regime
1 is a normal regime, and regime 2 is a down-market regime.















































































36Table 2: Regime-Switching Model for the Market Risk Factor, S&P 500
This table presents the results for the regime-switching model for the market risk factor, S&P 500. S&P 500
returns are in excess of one-month LIBOR. The following model is estimated: It=¹(St)+¾(St)²t; where ¹i
and ¾i are mean and standard deviation of regime i, respectively. There are three regimes that are estimated:
regime 0 (up-market), regime 1 (normal), and regime 2 (down-market). The frequency of S&P 500 regimes
from January 1994 to March 2005 is calculated. The 3X3 matrix of transition probabilities is estimated (Pij
is the transition probability of moving from regime i to regime j). Parameters that are signi¯cant at the 10%
level are shown in bold type.
Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat
5.79 15.22 0.85 2.53 -2.02 -2.25
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
1.52 12.80 2.49 25.74 4.51 29.46
Regime 0 Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 0 0.28 0.05 0.67
Regime 1 0.02 0.98 0.00
Regime 2 0.26 0.00 0.74




Regime 0P Regime 1P Regime 2P
Standard Deviation (%)
Regime 0V Regime 1V Regime 2V
Frequency of S&P500 regimes from 1994-2005 (%)
37Table 3: Variable De¯nitions
This table presents de¯nitions of market and other risk factors used in multi-factor models. All variables
except Change in VIX and Momentum Factor are obtained using Datastream. Change in VIX is obtained
from the CBOE. Momentum Factor is obtained from Ken French's website.
Variable Abbreviation Definition
S&P500 SP Monthly return of the S&P 500 index including dividends
Large-Small LS Monthly return difference between Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes
Value-Growth VG Monthly return difference between Russell 1000 Value and Growth indexes
USD USD Monthly return on Bank of England Trade Weighted Index
Lehman Government Credit L.GC Monthly return of the Lehman U.S. Aggregated Government/Credit index
Term Spread TS 10-year T Bond minus 6-month LIBOR
Change in VIX dVIX Monthly change in implied volatility based on the CBOE's OEX options.
Credit Spread CS The difference between BAA and AAA indexes provide by Moody's
Gold Gold Monthly return using gold bullion $/Troy Oz. Price
MSCI Emerging Bond MSCIEmD Monthly return of the MSCI Emerging Markets Bond Index
MSCI Emerging Stock MSCIEMS Monthly return of the MSCI Emerging Markets Stock Index
Momentum Factor UMD Momentum factor
38Table 4: Multi-factor Model
This table presents the nonlinear exposure of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to the S&P 500
(SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Government Credit (L.GC), Term Spread (TS),
Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI Emerging
Stock (MSCIEMS), and Momentum Factor (UMD) for di®erent S&P 500 regimes. The following model is
estimated: Rt=®(Zt)+¯(St)It+
PK
k=1 µk(St)Fkt+!(Zt)ut: It is the market factor, S&P 500, Fkt are other
risk factors, and !(Zt) is the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor. Regime 0: up-market, regime 1:





Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.77 11.25 -0.16 -0.75 0.09 0.83 0.32 6.06
D -0.38 -2.05 0.54 1.72 -0.07 -0.36
E0 (SP) 0.07 2.21 -1.02 -8.01 0.34 1.58 0.14 2.25
E1 (SP) 0.05 0.87 -1.01 -9.47 -0.28 -4.65 0.07 1.64
E2 (SP) -0.03 -1.12 -0.57 -4.83 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 -0.49
T1_0 (LS) -0.02 -0.94 0.27 1.75 0.14 0.88 0.04 0.66
T1_1 (LS) 0.01 0.32 0.99 9.78 -0.08 -2.02 -0.02 -0.69
T1_2 (LS) -0.08 -4.65 0.37 5.05 -0.17 -2.47 0.01 0.33
T2_0  (VG) 0.07 2.18 -0.25 -2.07
T2_1  (VG) 0.06 0.89 0.73 4.08
T2_2  (VG) 0.07 4.49 0.27 4.04
T3_0 (USD) 1.42 2.44 0.89 2.90
T3_1 (USD) -0.36 -1.42 0.03 0.46
T3_2 (USD) 0.12 0.29 -0.01 -0.03
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.14 1.71
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.00 -0.05
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.13 2.81
T5_0 (TS) -0.29 -1.29
T5_1 (TS) 0.22 1.68
T5_2 (TS) 0.18 1.52
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.05 1.79 -0.42 -2.69 0.58 3.82 0.08 1.40
T6_1 (dVIX) -0.04 -1.20 -0.27 -2.22 0.17 2.52 0.09 2.39
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.08 -2.98 0.27 2.15 -0.03 -0.20 -0.06 -1.69
T7_0 (CS) -2.02 -12.07 -1.97 -0.26 -7.56 -0.81 -0.41 -0.18
T7_1 (CS) 0.40 4.59 -4.96 -8.54 -1.99 -1.25 -1.85 -1.34




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) 1.10 1.75
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.42 -1.53
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) 0.19 0.55
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.55 3.16
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.50 14.08




Z 0.31 5.72 2.22 21.14 0.70 11.84 0.54 14.01
Z 1.61 10.80 3.01 16.47 1.15 7.72
p
Z
00 0.85 0.99 0.98
p
Z
11 0.86 0.99 0.96
Pseudo R
2 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.14




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D -0.07 -0.94 0.64 4.75 0.50 6.44 -0.17 -1.60
D 0.43 0.96 -2.95 -10.35 0.23 2.33
E0 (SP) 0.73 8.69 0.17 1.64 0.28 5.21 0.14 3.33
E1 (SP) 0.53 14.16 0.34 4.00 0.08 1.40 0.20 3.69
E2 (SP) 0.38 9.42 0.20 2.58 0.11 2.04 0.07 1.51
T1_0 (LS) -0.62 -6.21 -0.17 -1.80 -0.13 -3.77 -0.16 -2.39
T1_1 (LS) -0.29 -6.14 -0.19 -2.50 0.01 0.20 -0.14 -3.44
T1_2 (LS) -0.28 -6.12 -0.12 -2.32 -0.12 -3.92 -0.17 -6.51
T2_0  (VG) 0.10 0.88 0.16 3.35
T2_1  (VG) 0.04 0.37 -0.03 -0.46
T2_2  (VG) 0.09 1.87 0.07 2.59
T3_0 (USD) 0.11 1.71
T3_1 (USD) 0.22 3.25
T3_2 (USD) 0.05 0.66
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.13 0.65 0.14 0.43
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.05 0.78 0.20 1.65
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.29 2.38 0.12 0.75
T5_0 (TS) -0.62 -1.72
T5_1 (TS) -0.57 -5.67
T5_2 (TS) 0.14 0.65
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.28 3.89 0.11 1.02 0.25 7.76 0.01 0.24
T6_1 (dVIX) 0.11 2.90 0.20 2.48 0.07 1.31 0.15 3.24
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.02 -0.44 -0.25 -3.47 0.03 0.73 -0.15 -2.40
T7_0 (CS) 3.63 1.14 -6.04 -2.30 -0.34 -15.77 4.86 2.26
T7_1 (CS) -3.56 -1.72 -5.18 -5.10 -3.50 -69.20 -1.64 -1.53







T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 1.93
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.09 2.83
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 3.07
T11_0 (UMD) 0.24 4.27 0.04 1.84
T11_1 (UMD) 0.06 1.72 0.05 1.15
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 4.99 0.02 1.35
Z 0.93 21.97 1.31 16.99 0.79 18.65 0.48 10.89
Z 2.35 5.11 2.74 4.85 0.97 20.35
p
Z
00 0.99 0.98 0.98
p
Z
11 0.91 0.66 1.00
Pseudo R
2 0.31 0.16 0.25
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
40Figure 3: Number of Strategies with Signi¯cant Factor Exposures for the Multi-
factor Model
This ¯gure depicts the number of strategies with signi¯cant factor exposures for the multi-factor regime-
switching model during up-market, normal, and down-market regimes of the S&P 500. The following factors
are considered: S&P 500 (SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Government Credit
(L.GC), Term Spread (TS), Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging Bond
(MSCIEMD), MSCI Emerging Stock (MSCIEMS), and Momentum Factor (UMD) for di®erent S&P 500
regimes. The following model is estimated: Rt=®(Zt)+¯(St)It+
PK
k=1 µk(St)Fkt+!(Zt)ut: It is the market
factor, S&P 500, Fkt are other risk factors, and !(Zt) is the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor. Regime
0: up-market, regime 1: normal, and regime 2: down-market. Parameters that are signi¯cant at the 10%
level are shown in bold type.




























41Figure 4: Probability of Being in a High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for CA, EM, and EM Strategies
These ¯gures depict the probability of being in a high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Figure 5: Probability of Being in a High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for LS, ED and RA Strategies
These ¯gures depict the probability of being in a high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Figure 6: The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for All Hedge Fund Strategies
Panel A presents the joint ¯ltered probability of high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for all
CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies from January 1994 to March 2005. Panel B concentrates on the
joint ¯ltered probability of high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor in 1998, around the time of
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis.
Panel A The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk Factor 
for All Hedge Fund Strategies: January 1994 - March 2005
Panel B The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk Factor
for All Hedge Fund Strategies:  LTCM crisis of 1998














































































































































































































































44Figure 7: Evolution of the Idiosyncratic Risk Factor for Individual Strategies:
Recent Events
This ¯gure presents the evolution of the idiosyncratic risk factor for individual strategies from January 2005
to January 2008 (with and without Emerging Markets). Panel A (B) presents the probability of a high-
volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Long Short Equity, and Risk
Arbitrage (Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, and Equity Market Neutral) strategies.
Panel A Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk Factor 
for Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Long Short Equity, and Risk Arbitrage strategies
Panel B Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk Factor 
for Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, and Equity Market Neutral strategies


















































































































































































































































45Figure 8: The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for All Hedge Fund Strategies: Recent Events
Panel A presents the joint ¯ltered probability of high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for all
CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies from January 2005 to January 2008 (with and without Emerging
Markets). Panel B presents the joint ¯ltered probability of high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor
for Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk Arbitrage, Convertible Bond Arbitrage, and Equity Market Neutral
strategies.
Panel A The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk Factor 
for All Hedge Fund Strategies: January 2005 - January 2008
Panel B The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk Factor 
for Convertible Bond Arb., Risk Arbitrage, Event Driven Multi-Strategy 
and Equity Market Neutral Strategies: January 1994 - January 2008
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46Table 5: Multi-factor Linear Factor Model (LFM)
This table presents the results for the regression of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies on
S&P 500 (SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Government Credit (L.GC), Term
Spread (TS), Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI
Emerging Stock (MSCIEMS) and Momentum Factor (UMD). Hedge fund returns, S&P 500, USD, Lehman
Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns. !0 is the volatility of the idiosyncratic
risk factor. Parameters that are signi¯cant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat
D 0.33 3.39 -0.24 -1.25 0.23 1.45 0.31 4.99
E (SP) 0.05 1.43 -0.87 -12.74 0.09 1.33 0.07 4.72
E (LS) -0.08 -1.95 0.47 5.61
E  (VG) 0.23 4.36
E (USD) 0.17 2.35
E (L.GC) 0.20 2.70 0.68 3.82
E (TS) 0.91 3.88
E (dVIX) 0.20 2.94
E (CS) -0.95 -428.94 -3.90 -299.92
E (Gold) -0.11 -2.23
E (MSCIEMD) -0.62 -5.49
E(MSCIEMS) 0.62 14.79
E (UMD) 0.19 7.55
Z 1.27 11.31 2.48 16.48 2.54 19.96 0.78 16.48
Adj. R
2 0.04 0.75 0.51 0.14
Pseudo R
2 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.04
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat
D 0.01 0.09 0.46 3.05 0.30 2.04 0.09 1.02
E (SP) 0.57 12.77 0.29 4.20 0.25 3.21 0.17 4.84
E (LS) -0.39 -9.41 -0.19 -4.38 -0.15 -3.32 -0.16 -4.86
E  (VG) 0.11 2.29 0.10 2.20 0.08 3.03
E (USD) 0.20 3.66
E (L.GC) 0.14 1.82 0.24 2.54
E (TS) -0.23 -1.78
E (dVIX) 0.09 1.67
E (CS) -4.21 -2.32 -3.37 -2.79 -3.74 -3.12
E (Gold)
E (MSCIEMD) -0.15 -2.75
E(MSCIEMS) 0.06 1.72
E (UMD) 0.23 6.41 0.07 3.10
Z 1.36 11.09 1.42 6.22 1.28 6.63 0.93 12.74
Adj. R
2 0.78 0.43 0.45 0.41
Pseudo R
2 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.11
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets Equity Market Neutral
47Table 6: Option-Based Model
This table presents the results for the option-based regression of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index
strategies on S&P 500 return (SP), Wilshire 1750 Small Cap - Wilshire 750 Large Cap return (SC-LC),
month end-to-month end change in the Federal Reserve's ten year constant maturity yield (10Y), Credit
Spread (CS), return of a portfolio of lookback straddles on bond futures (Bd Opt), return of a portfolio
of lookback straddles on currency futures (FX Opt), and return of a portfolio of lookback straddles on
commodity futures (Com Opt). !0 is the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor. Panel A presents the
results for all eight hedge fund strategies, and Panel B depicts the number of strategies with signi¯cant factor
exposures for the Fung and Hsieh (FHM) and multi-factor regime-switching (MRSM) models. Parameters




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.24 2.20 0.05 0.25 -0.06 -0.21 0.29 4.48
E (SP) 0.03 1.05 -0.94 -16.51 0.51 7.04 0.08 5.10
E (SC-LC) 0.06 1.77 -0.51 -6.51 0.31 3.67
E (10Y) -1.09 -2.04
E (CS) -1.91 -1.86 -3.89 -1.71
E (Bd Opt) -0.05 -2.07
E (FX Opt) 0.01 2.92
E (Com Opt)
Z 1.30 15.71 2.54 15.04 3.91 17.42 0.75 15.39
Adj. R
2 0.05 0.75 0.34 0.20
Pseudo R
2 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.05
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.23 1.52 0.47 3.69 0.33 3.31 0.11 1.36
E (SP) 0.45 12.32 0.22 7.66 0.19 4.23 0.13 4.98
E (SC-LC) 0.41 11.50 0.14 3.87 0.13 4.30 0.13 6.29
E (10Y) -1.89 -3.42 -1.15 -1.91 -0.84 -2.15
E (CS) -2.76 -2.44 -2.52 -2.43
E (Bd Opt) -0.02 -1.78 -0.03 -2.12 -0.02 -2.78
E (FX Opt) -0.03 -3.21
E (Com Opt) 0.02 1.63
Z 1.80 16.44 1.40 14.93 1.16 7.00 0.92 13.86
Adj. R
2 0.63 0.44 0.50 0.42
Pseudo R
2 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.11
Panel B
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets Equity Market Neutral
Number of strategies






























48Table 7: Linear Factor Model with a Crisis Dummy
This table presents the results for the regression of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies on
S&P 500 (SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Government Credit (L.GC), Term
Spread (TS), Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI
Emerging Stock (MSCIEMS), and Momentum Factor (UMD), and interactions of these risk factors with a
crisis dummy. The crisis dummy is equal to one when the Mexican, Asian, Russian and LTCM, Brazilian,
Argentinean, and Internet crises are observed (the crises periods are identi¯ed by Rigobon (2003), Table 2).
Hedge fund returns, S&P 500, USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR
returns. !0 is the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor. Parameters that are signi¯cant at the 10% level




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.43 4.89 -0.09 -0.45 -0.02 -0.10 0.30 4.51
E0 (SP) 0.01 0.38 -0.86 -16.11 0.17 2.12 0.07 4.62
E0 (SP) dummy 0.09 1.83 -0.39 -3.36
E (LS) -0.08 -2.67 0.61 8.38 -0.03 -1.35
E (LS) dummy -0.43 -3.50 0.08 2.07
E2 (VG) 0.22 3.76
E2 (VG) dummy
E3 (USD)
E3 (USD) dummy 0.38 4.12
E4 (L.GC) 0.20 2.69
E4 (L.GC) dummy
E (TS) -0.25 -1.80 1.00 4.54 -0.18 -2.03
E (TS) dummy 1.09 4.76 0.32 2.09
E6 (dVIX) 0.25 3.52
E6 (dVIX) dummy
E7 (CS)
E7 (CS) dummy 1.13 16.01
E8 (Gold) -0.11 -2.32 -0.09 -1.59
E8 (Gold) dummy -0.45 -3.28
E9 (MSCIEMD) 0.36 4.04
E(LHEMEMD) dummy 0.32 2.58
E10 (MSCIEMS) 0.46 9.10
E10 (MSCIEMS) dummy
E11 (UMD) 0.19 4.48
E11 (UMD) dummy
Z 1.11 11.05 2.36 16.58 2.34 16.80 0.76 16.76
Adj. R
2 0.19 0.78 0.75 0.16
Pseudo R
2 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.05




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.08 0.81 0.59 5.55 0.45 4.94 0.17 2.27
E0 (SP) 0.47 9.78 0.16 5.01 0.11 2.95 0.12 5.17
E0 (SP) dummy 0.26 2.95 0.18 3.26
E (LS) -0.35 -10.15 -0.14 -4.33 -0.13 -4.68 -0.15 -7.07
E (LS) dummy
E2 (VG) -0.11 -2.92 0.07 2.26
E2 (VG) dummy 0.11 2.55
E3 (USD)
E3 (USD) dummy 0.31 3.29
E4 (L.GC)
E4 (L.GC) dummy
E (TS) -0.46 -4.82
E (TS) dummy 0.48 2.18 0.51 1.87 0.76 4.13 0.38 2.77
E6 (dVIX) 0.14 3.12 0.07 1.93 0.07 2.16
E6 (dVIX) dummy -0.20 -5.13
E7 (CS) -2.64 -1.86
E7 (CS) dummy -8.11 -1.71 -5.27 -2.00
E8 (Gold)
E8 (Gold) dummy 0.24 2.53 -0.10 -1.82
E9 (MSCIEMD) 0.16 4.39 0.14 3.80 0.10 2.59
E9 (MSCIEMD) dummy 0.18 2.85
E10 (MSCIEMS) 0.04 1.64
E10 (MSCIEMS) dummy -0.10 -1.65 -0.13 -2.73
E11 (UMD) 0.20 7.06
E11 (UMD) dummy
Z 1.23 16.17 1.19 14.43 0.96 15.98 0.84 16.45
Adj. R
2 0.82 0.59 0.64 0.50
Pseudo R
2 0.26 0.16 0.21 0.15
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
50Table 8: Out-of-Sample Tests
The table presents results for out-of-sample mimicking performance tests. An out-of-sample of 33 months
(from November 2004 to July 2007) is used. Mean Absolute Error is calculated as the mean of absolute
di®erences between the actual hedge fund index returns and returns of replicating portfolios. Replicating
portfolios for each hedge fund index strategy are constructed using the factor loadings obtained from the
multi-factor regime-switching beta model (MRSM). At each time t, factor loadings are estimated, and are
combined with values of risk factors at t+1 to construct returns of the replicating portfolios. The procedure
is repeated 33 times. Results for Mean Absolute Error (MAE) tests for Linear factor model (LFM), Random
Walk (RW), Multi-factor Regime-Switching Beta (MRSM), and Fung and Hsieh option-based model (FHM)
are presented.
Strategy/Test
LFM RW MRSM FHM
Conv. Bond Arb. 0.83 0.80 0.75 0.74
Dedicated Shortseller 1.78 3.13 1.71 1.73
Emerging Markets 0.92 2.00 0.69 1.54
Equity Mkt Neutral 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.46
Long/Short Equity 0.69 1.74 0.79 0.95
Distressed 0.51 0.83 0.49 0.56
Event Driven MS 0.72 1.15 0.59 0.63
Risk Arb 0.51 0.76 0.49 0.57
MAE
51Figure 9: The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for All Hedge Fund Strategies: Linear Factor and Fung and Hsieh Models
This ¯gure presents the joint ¯ltered probability of high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor
for all CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies from January 1994 to January 2008 for a linear factor
idiosyncratic switching volatility model (LFIM) and Fung and Hsieh idiosyncratic switching volatility model
(FHIM). LFIM: Rt = ®(Zt) + ¸kLk;t + !(Zt) and FHIM: Rt = ®(Zt) + ¸kHk;t + !(Zt), where Rt is the
return of a hedge-fund index in period t, Lk;t are k linear factors, Hk;t are k Fung and Hsieh option-based
factors, and ! is the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor. The Markov chain Zt characterizes the change
in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor.
Joint High Volatility Probability of Idiosyncratic Risk Factor
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